1.Introduction
Today, it is widely recognized that climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humanity (Schneider, 2011) . Since climate change is expected to have severe consequences for many citizens around the globe, considerable money and effort have been initiated in educating the public of the causes and effects of climate change and of 3 how laypeople should behave to mitigate and adapt to a changing climate.
1 For over a decade, social scientists have studied the public understanding of climate change, analyzing, for example, whether laypeople understand or misunderstand climate science (e.g., Etkin & Ho, 2007; Seacrest et al., 2000; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002 ), laypeople's attitudes to various action strategies (e.g., Ohe & Ikeda, 2005) and barriers to public engagement in climate change (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007a In all, a total of 109 papers were identified from the data base searches. Of these, 17 were considered as falling out of the scope of the review, which left me with a total of 92 articles. These papers were read in their entirety and thematically analyzed with focus on the main arguments of the paper, rationales for studying the public understanding of climate change/ the goal of climate change communication, and what was seen as affecting the perceptions of the public and public engagement.
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All data-base driven reviews of course suffer from limitations. One obvious limitation here is related to the selection of a particular time period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . When scanning the CCC literature, some of these papers make reference to a few studies published in the 1990s. The vast bulk of research, however, has been conducted in the 2000s, which is why the present review started in the year 2000. Moreover, in a paper published in 2000, Bulkeley argued that at that time much attention was being paid to public responses to environmental issues in general, but studies focusing on climate change were rare. Due to the fact that the data base search was performed in early 2012, the year 2011 was considered a natural end point and papers published until the end of 2011 were included in the sample. Another limitation is that not all potentially relevant journals might be indexed in the selected databases, and that the data base search only includes journal articles. To avoid overlooking central strands of CCC literature, I have consulted the reference lists of the papers included in the review to check for frequently referred works not included in my sample. As a result, the review was complemented with a few books and reports (Carvalho, 2008; Eurobarometer, 2011; Hulme, 2009; Leiserowitz et al., 2011 a, b) . Moreover, it is worth noting that the numerous studies examining media coverage of climate change have not actively been included in the sample (except where they have an explicit reception focus, analyzing public understanding of media messages of climate change). This is motivated by the focus of the review on the role of the public as an audience for climate change communication, how the public understands and interprets climate change and the barriers to public engagement. However, I have used some of the most frequently cited studies which examine media coverage of climate change as background material to contextualize the literature review. Last but not least, there may well be studies published in languages other than English, which thus were not found in the data base searches.
9 the so called "information deficit model", which treats basic science education as remedy for public distrust and lack of interest in climate change (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2009; Lewenstein & Brossard, 2006; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009) , studies endorsing the public engagement in science perspective emphasize that increased scientific literacy is not a sufficient goal for climate change communication. Instead of being mere receivers of climate change messages, public engagement means that the public needs to actively take part in learning and action on climate change; engagement involves "minds, hearts and hands" (Wolf & Moser, 2011, p. 550) .
Public engagement in climate change could be of two types. First, public engagement could be equaled with public participation in climate science and policy processes (e.g. Few et al., 2007) . This is a particular type of engagement which presupposes "a degree of active involvement in taking decisions" (ibid.:49). Such public participation activities often have as their explicit or implicit goal to empower public groups to engage in science as part of an agenda to "democratize" science (Lewenstein & Brossard, 2006) . Second, it has been argued that public engagement in climate change should be seen as "a personal state of connection with the issue of climate change [...] concurrently comprising cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects" (Lorenzoni et al., 2007a:446, emphasis in original) . For people to be engaged in climate change, they need to care about the issue, feel motivated and have the ability to take action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007a; Wolf & Moser, 2011) . In this view, people can be engaged in climate change without necessarily taking part in processes of public participation in policy making (ibid.).
In sum, this section has briefly outlined the general trend in science communication from information transfer informed by the information deficit model to dialogical or participatory modes of communication aimed at enhancing public engagement. Regardless of the model chosen for science communication, however, such communication does not take place in a vacuum. In the following, we will turn to contextual factors such as media coverage and framings, or preexisting frames of interpretation among the public which influence how different publics respond to science-based information and communication.
4.The communicative context: climate change, media, and the public Dillon (2003) argues that a large number of educational researchers endorse constructivist theories of learning. A constructivist perspective on learning emphasizes that "we build (construct) knowledge through social interactions-so that through dialogue, we become more knowledgeable" (Dillon 2003:218 
Media coverage of climate change
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The mass media are seen as important actors in influencing public awareness and opinion on climate change (e.g., Nisbet, 2009; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2008) . Many studies have highlighted the decisive role of news media such as television, newspapers, and the Internet in shaping public understanding of scientific issues by acting as bridges between scientists and the lay public (e.g., Kahlor & Rosenthal, 2009; Olausson, 2011; Ryghaug et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2011) . Others have analyzed the impact of popular culture representations of climate change, such as the Hollywood movie The Day after Tomorrow, on public awareness of climate change (Balmford et al., 2004; Leiserowitz, 2004; Lowe et al., 2006) . Some researchers have noted that the tendency in the mass media towards sensationalism and alarmism may be counter-productive for public engagement in climate change (e.g. Hulme, 2007) . In other words, how the mass media frame the issue of climate change strongly influences how the public will understand and interpret it (Boykoff, 2007; Nisbet, 2009 ). In framing climate change, the media highlight what could be seen as the core of the issue, suggest linkages between events, propose which actors should be seen as responsible and suggest how problems should be handled (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Nisbet, 2009 ).
Analyses of news media framings of climate change have demonstrated differences in how climate change is described in different national contexts. For instance, in Sweden (Olausson, 2009) , France (Brossard et al., 2004) , and Germany (Weingart et al., 2000) studies have identified a "frame of certainty," assuming that "human-induced global warming is a direct cause of climate change, bringing with it dramatic consequences already at hand" (Olausson, 2009, p. 429) . In the US context, in contrast, the frame of "scientific uncertainty" has been widely used by climate skeptics to undermine public concern about climate change (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009 ). In addition, the journalistic practice of giving equal weight to both sides in a debate has contributed to give the false impression that climate skeptics are as numerous and as influential as the scientists who acknowledge the human-induced causes of climate change (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004) . This type of "balanced reporting" on climate change contributed to "a period of uncertainty among policy makers and the public" in the USA in the 2000s (Schweitzer et al., 2009, p. 269) . In recent years, however, the "scientific uncertainty framing" in the US mass media is observed to be less frequent (Boykoff, 2007; Zhao et al., 2011) .
Public perceptions of climate change
In light of the complexity and uncertainty involved in the issue of climate change, how is it understood by laypeople? Recent research indicates that although awareness of climate change is now high in many countries (Whitmarsh, 2011) , the last couple of years have seen a decline in public concern about climate change, at least in United
States and to some extent in the UK (Leiserowitz et al., 2011a; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) . In the US, the number of respondents to the survey "Climate change in the American mind" who were very worried or somewhat worried about global warming declined from 63% to 52% between November 2008 and May 2011 (Leiserowitz et al., 2011a) . Other US surveys show similar results , and there are signs of a certain "issue fatigue" at least within some segments of the American public . For the UK, the picture is mixed. A survey reported by Reser et al. (2012) found 71% of UK respondents to still be very or fairly concerned about climate change. Other studies have shown that a growing number of people believe that claims about climate change, and in particular its impacts, have been exaggerated (Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011 (Eurobarometer, 2011 ). An Australian survey identified 66% of the respondents to be very or fairly concerned about climate change (Reser et al., 2012) .
In a review of fifteen years of climate change perceptions research in Europe and the USA, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) found some recurrent results. The informants in the various studies were widely aware of the issue of climate change, but their understanding of the causes of and solutions to climate change was incomplete.
Climate change was regarded as a serious risk, but participants in the studies perceived it as distant in space as well as time. Hence, the informants conceived of climate change as less important than other personal or social risks. As regards informants' preparedness to address the threats they still perceived in relation to climate change, they saw governments as the main responsible bodies, although they generally expressed some willingness to act in response to climate change-induced threats. Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) conclude that earlier studies demonstrate the ambivalence of lay people's attitudes towards climate change. The public needs to balance the problems of everyday life with awareness of the social problems that climate change may give rise to. In a later review, Wolf and Moser (2011) draw similar conclusions about how the public in developed countries perceive and understand climate change.
In sum, earlier research suggests that although climate change is now firmly put on the public agenda, the communicative context of climate change, at least in Europe and North America, is characterized by ongoing debate, uncertainty and controversies of various kinds (e.g. Campbell, 2011; Donner, 2011; Featherstone et al., 2009 ). Many voices are blended in public discourse on climate change, representing different positions and standpoints towards how laypeople could best contribute to mitigating and adapting to climate change effects. It has been argued that 'for many members of the public, climate change is likely to be the ultimate ambiguous situation given its complexity and perceived uncertainty' (Nisbet 2009:16) . Still, the public is faced with expectations, not least from governments across the world, to assume responsibility for responding to climate change in various ways (Ockwell et al., 2009 ).
This brings us to the issues of the goal of climate change communication and barriers to public engagement in climate change, which will be discussed in the following. Although the literature rarely discusses these questions in depth, analysis of the papers included in the review reveals different rationales for climate change communication.
Goals and rationales for climate change communication
In the reviewed CCC literature, the ultimate goal for climate change communication appears to be the same, i.e., to identify communication strategies that efficiently support sustainable development and reduce climate impact. The papers start from the assumption that laypeople have important roles to play in mitigating and adapting to climate change. In the reviewed papers, it is often argued that the public must be engaged individually and collectively in responding to climate change. How to attain the overarching goal of reducing climate impact through public communication,
however, is conceptualized in various ways. The studied papers identify three ways in which the public could respond to climate change: lifestyle change, political influence, and participation in climate science and policy dialogue.
When it comes to the issue of lifestyle change in response to the challenges of climate change, Maibach et al. (2008) point to four areas in which mitigation action could be taken on an individual level: reduction of household energy use, recycling, surface transportation behavior, and "green" consumerism. According to Moser (2006) , individuals acting collectively play two critical roles in climate mitigation: 1) they can exert influence via consumption patterns as consumers of environmental resources, material goods, and energy, and 2) they can exert political influence by supporting climate-friendly policies. These two points were also made in several other studied papers as well. The need to foster climate-friendly lifestyles has been emphasized by many scholars. 5 As regards the role of the public in supporting climate-friendly policies, it has been argued, for example, that public misunderstanding of climate change will obstruct efficient policy making Moser, 2006) . Likewise, individual efforts to respond to climate change will be less powerful if not coordinated and guided by well-functioning policy. It is worth noting, however, that lifestyle change and political influence are often presented in the CCC literature as complementary rather than separate responses.
An increasing number of studies point to the need for public participation in climate science and policy matters (e.g., Featherstone et al., 2009; Kahlor & Rosenthal, 2009; Maibach & Hornig Priest, 2009; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Stamm et al., 2000; Whitmarsh, 2008) . In other words, this strand of literature deals with the first of the two types of public engagement discussed in Section 3. Such engagement can take the form of participation in, for example, consensus conferences, town meetings, and deliberative forums (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009) . Calls for increased public participation in decisionmaking have been motivated by the insight that climate change management is based on "value-driven decisions made in the face of risk and uncertainty" (Lorenzoni et al., 2007b, p. 66) , which calls for the involvement of a multitude of stakeholders in a so called "extended peer community" (Lorenzoni et al., 2007b; cf. Funtowizc & Ravetz, 1993; Nowotny et al., 2001) . Lorenzoni et al. (2007b, p. 67) argue that decisions on climate change must involve "decentralized public-sphere politics and multilayered democratic participation. This should enable diverse knowledge and perspectives to contribute, fostering mutual learning and reflexivity, evaluation of trade-offs, uncertainties, and their distribution."
The CCC literature cites a few examples of public participation exercises (Few et al., 2007; Herriman et al., 2011) , ranging from small-scale deliberations involving local stake-holders and community members in Christchurch Bay and the Orkney Islands, UK, in decisions on coastal management in the face of climate change (Few et al., 2007) to a large international attempt to engage the public in deliberations on climate change through the WorldWideViews of Global Warming project (Herriman et al., 2011) .The latter project employed workshops taking place at the same date in 38 countries across the world, and aimed to give lay people a voice in the 2009 UN Climate summit (COP15) in Copenhagen. The results of the workshops were disseminated to COP15 negotiators in the form of a list that included the following recommendations resulting from the participants in the WorldWideViews project:
"Make a deal at COP15; Keep the temperature increase below 2 degrees; Annex 1 countries should reduce emissions with 25-40 or more by 2020; Fast-growing economies should also reduce emisions by 2020; Low-income developing countries should limit emissions; Give high priority to an international financial mechanism;
Punish non-complying countries; Make technology availabe to everyone; Strengthen or supplement international institutions" (Bedsted & Klüwer, 2009: 4) .
According to Herriman et al. (2011) , the WorldWideViews project was successful in arranging and conducting participatory events in a number of countries simultaneously. Through the use of the Internet, the participants were able to see and compare results from different countries while the deliberative event was unfolding. It should be noted, however, that there was no centralized evaluation strategy linked to the WorldWideViews project, which means that it is hard to assess the quality of the participatory process or its political impact (ibid.). In terms of public engagement, it seems that those lay people who participated in the WorldWideViews were engaged in the issue of climate change and took active part in generating the outcomes of the workshops. However, more or less the same number of participants (about 100) was recruited in each participating country, regardless whether the country had a large or small population (ibid. (Corner & Randall, 2011) . However, further research is needed into how public participation could be inclusive, meaningful and secure broadbased public engagement (Few et al., 2007) . For participatory exercises to be successful, people need to be willing to contribute with their time and their ideas. Since public participation events are often set up to include only a limited group of participants, there is a risk that only special interest or elite groups opt to take part (Few et al., 2007; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004) . Herriman et al. (2011:27) note that "people who are extremely poor, displaced or otherwise vulnerable are likely to be unable or unwilling to participate in any global deliberative process. In countries where a large proportion of the population struggles simply to survive each day, those who do end up participating are therefore less likely to be representative of the general population".
When scrutinizing the CCC literature chronologically from 2000 and onward, a shift in focus over time from public understanding of climate change to public engagement in climate change was observed. This goes both for engagement as defined as "a personal state of connection with the issue of climate change" (Lorenzoni et al., 2007:446; cf. e.g. Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Wolf & Moser, 2011) and engagement defined as public participation in climate policy deliberations (e.g. Few et al., 2007; Herriman et al., 2011) . The trend from public understanding to public engagement has also been noted by e.g. Nerlich et al. (2009) , and is similar to the trend from public understanding to public engagement noted in the broader science communication literature (see Section 3). There are, however, often barriers to public engagement in climate-related issues (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Wolf & Moser, 19 2011 ). We will now turn to the issue of how such barriers could be understood and addressed, which is the topic of many CCC studies.
6.Barriers to public engagement in climate change -and some potential solutions
The CCC literature finds that engaging the public in combating climate change presents a range of challenges (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007) . Practical experience indicates that public education and communication strategies have often failed (Moser & Dilling, 2004; Ockwell et al., 2009 ). This could be due to "the creeping nature of climate change, its complexity and uncertainty, system lags, human perception limits, and communication failures on the part of scientists" (Moser & Dilling, 2004:34) .
Nevertheless, the CCC literature also presents a number of potential solutions to address the barriers to public engagement and positively encourage public engagement in climate change. For climate change educators in non-formal contexts, this literature offers understanding of why lay people may hesitate to engage in learning activities on climate change and how such learning could be encouraged. This section will first identify barriers to public engagement found in the CCC literature (see also Table 1) and thereafter discuss potential strategies for addressing some of them.
Barriers to public engagement
One barrier that was commonly discussed not least in the beginning of the studied period refers to scientific illiteracy, more specifically, to the inability of laypeople to understand the complexities of climate science. For example, Seacrest et al. (2000) argue that laypeople tend to misunderstand the fundamental physical processes contributing to climate change. Etkin and Ho (2007) , in summarizing the findings of 20 earlier research, discuss, among other matters, laypeople's difficulties in thinking probabilistically. For instance, it has been claimed that "people tend to overestimate the probability of relatively infrequent events […] and underestimate the probability of relatively frequent events […]" (Patt & Schrag, 2003, p. 18) . Moreover, Sterman and Sweeney (2007) argue, based on an experimental study, that laypeople have difficulties understanding the system dynamics underlying climate change. Ungar (2000) found that lay people tended to conflate global warming with other, more conspicuous environmental problems, such as ozone depletion. In line with these results, it has been argued that people's behavior is governed by their mental models. A mental model can be defined as people's "beliefs about the networks of causes and effects that describe how a system operates, along with the boundary of the model ... and the time horizon considered relevant" (Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, p. 215 ). The claim is that lay mental models are less specific than expert mental models and thus less suited to understanding the complexities of climate change (Lazo et al., 2000) . Sterman (2011, p. 813) argues that "/w/here the dynamics of complex systems are conditioned by multiple feedbacks, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities, mental models […] often fail to account for these elements of dynamic complexity". According to Sterman (ibid.) , it is crucial to identify ways to improve science communication of complex concepts to media, to foster action based on "the best scientific understanding".
A contrasting explanation concerns the socio-cultural preconditions for public engagement in climate change. In response to the mental models approach and the deficit model for science communication, it has been argued that even though climate change science has now been publicly communicated for over 30 years, and the level of public awareness and knowledge of the causes and effects of climate change has increased in many countries, we have not witnessed much change in the public's 21 behavior and lifestyles (e.g. Whitmarsh et al., 2011) . This is known in the social science literature as the "value-action gap" or the "attitude-behavior divide" (Grob, 1995; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Nicholson-Cole, 2005) and it can be observed not only for climate change, but also for other so called "bigger-than-self problems" which may not be in people's immediate self-interest to contribute to solving (Corner & Randall, 2011 (Donner, 2011; McCright, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011; Wolf & Moser, 2011) .
Furthermore, a sense of agency is a key factor in determining whether people will engage in pro-environmental behavior. Unless people believe that "they can do something about the problem, and that it is worth doing something", it will be difficult to encourage engagement (Howell 2011: 178) .
In the CCC literature there is a substantial body of knowledge about ways of positively encouraging public engagement in climate change. In the following I will discuss the role of a) the content of climate change communication; b) visualizations; c) framing; d) audience segmentation. These four areas where chosen for further discussion since they are recurrently mentioned in the CCC literature. They were also chosen as broad areas, each integrating several particular solutions brought up in the literature. It is worth noting, however, that the four types of solutions discussed below complement each other and should not be viewed as separate solutions.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Solutions
The content of climate change communication Focusing climate change communication on solutions rather than on problems is also suggested as a strategy for enhancing public engagement (Cooney, 2010; Maibach et al., 2010) . Positive stories of how 'ordinary people' (i.e. not 'environmentalists') take action on climate change is seen as a promising road for climate change communication, since such stories take advantage of the power of constructive social norms (Howell, 2011:186) . There are also examples of web-based movements that aim to inspire lay people to engage in community-based projects centered around e.g. communal gardens or bicycle commuting. In terms of fostering public engagement, such locally based projects offer a positive outlook on the future and promotes a sense of agency and control for lay people (Cooney, 2010) .
Furthermore, it has been argued that positive feedback on individual action to mitigate climate change could be effective for increasing public engagement (Cooney, 2010; Howell, 2011 . Such feedback could for instance take the form of financial payback to homeowners who take measures to reduce emissions and decrease energy use (Cooney, 2010) . Feedback on individual action could also be given through online tools such as carbon calculators, where individuals can calculate their 'carbon footprint' and compare the "relative contribution of different activities and how their lifestyles compare to others locally, nationally and globally" (Whitmarsh et al., p. 58) . However, it is worth noting that in case individuals are not motivated to change, carbon calculators and similar tools will probably not motivate behavior change (ibid.).
On the other hand, according to Whitmarsh et al. (2011) , exploratory research suggests that carbon calculators may be successful in making climate change more relevant to the individual who calculates his or her carbon footprint, and therefore could be useful in spurring engagement.
Visualizations
Another problem of making climate change salient in public communication lies in its unseen and intangible character (Moser & Dilling, 2004) . Climate change is often perceived by the public as a spatially and temporally remote risk (Poortinga et al., 2011 (Poortinga et al., :1016 . concern such canaries have usually been glaciers or icecaps, seen either in retreat or in dramatic fragmentation" (Hamblyn, 2009:230) . The role of climate change canaries, Hamblyn (2009:231) argues, is to "render global warming visible". However, images such as melting ice caps, polar bears, floods or dried river beds, which are commonly used in climate change communication (Hamblyn, 2009; Manzo, 2010) , frame climate change as a far-away issue, the consequences of which are remote in time and space, and thereby difficult for individual laypeople to influence through everyday behaviour. Doyle (2007: 142) claims that "such images produce a distancing effect, relegating climate change impacts to a remote and inaccessible place, where animals and habitats are affected rather than humans." By contrast, it has been suggested that climate change images should be nonthreatening and link to people's everyday concerns and emotions When looking at such images, the interviewees saw the local relevance of climate change and felt that they could make a difference.
It has been argued that "visualisation has great potential to be used more extensively as a means to communicate and stimulate public willingness to engage with Immersive dome environments, interactive ICT-based decision arenas and 3D landscape visualization are but a few examples of how climate-related issues are visualized and thereby made tangible and concrete to lay audiences Neset et al., 2010; Niepold et al., 2008; Sheppard, 2005) . In addition to common forms of data visualization through maps, charts and diagrams, Sheppard (2005) (Sheppard, 2005) .
Framing
Much of the recent CCC literature highlight the importance of framing climate change in ways that make sense to lay audiences for influencing public engagement (e.g. Corner & Randall, 2011; Hart, 2011; Maibach et al., 2010; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Mooney, 2007; Patchen, 2010) . Corner and Randall (2011:1011) argue that "deep framing", which refers to "the connections that are forged between a particular communicating strategy or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles" offers "one method of linking climate change engagement strategies with values that are more conducive to solving bigger-than-self problems". It has been argued that reframing of climate change could be one way of encouraging engagement among segments of the public which do not usually engage in environmental issues. 6 For instance, leaving the traditional framing of climate change as an environmental problem and reframing it to better resonate with the framings of the target audiences has been suggested as way of encouraging public engagement. Alternatives include framing climate change as a public health issue, emphasizing potential health benefits of emissions reductions, less use of car transportation, altered dietary habits etc. ; a security issue, emphasizing risks to personal security posed by drastic climate change, and highlighting links between energy supply and security concerns (Zia & Todd, 2010) ; a religious or moral issue, emphasizing "a moral obligation to protect the Earth and God's living things" (ibid.: 757); and/or an economic issue, linking climate change with the economic crisis and "framing energy efficiency as a cost-cutting and waste-saving measure" (ibid.: 758). The health frame has proved particularly beneficial in inspiring hope and encouraging public support for mitigation and adaptation measures, at least among segments of the U.S. public (Myers et al., 2012) .
Audience segmentation
The CCC literature repeatedly states that "the public is not homogeneous; there are many different publics" (e.g. Featherstone et al., 2009, p. 214; cf. Akerlof et al., 2011; Kim & Neff, 2009; Lowe et al., 2006; Moser, 2006; Maibach et al., 2008; O'Neill & Hulme, 2009; Schweitzer et al., 2009) . By segmenting the audience into target groups, climate change communication can be elaborated to resonate with the different interpretative frames of different target groups, and thereby make more sense to the public (Akerlof et al., 2011; Lowe et al., 2006; Maibach et al., 2008; Moser, 2006) . The studied papers discuss various ways of doing such segmentation. The traditional approach to audience segmentation has been to divide subpopulations according to demographic traits such as gender, age, or socioeconomic background (Maibach et al., 2008) . However, this is arguably not a satisfactory way of organizing climate change communication activities. It has been claimed that demographics alone cannot efficiently predict attitudes and practices related to climate change; an alternative strategy would be to base segmentation on a variety of psychosocial variables (Maibach et al., 2008) . For example, audience segmentation could be based on research into different "interpretive communities of risk" defined by climate change risk perceptions, values, beliefs, media use, and policy preferences (Maibach et al., 2008 ). An interpretive community could be defined as a subpopulation whose members "share similar perceptions, understandings, concerns, and emotional responses to global warming" (Moser, 2006, p. 5) . Some of the studied papers identify various interpretive communities. For example, audiences could be segmented along an opinion spectrum ranging from complete denial of climate change ("naysayers") to extreme concern ("alarmists") (Moser, 2006, p. 5) . In between, there may be a group that doubts the anthropogenic causes of climate change and an uninterested group that believes in human contribution to climate change, but does not regard the climate issue as important (Lorenzoni, 2003; quoted in Lowe et al., 2006) . A similar approach to audience segmentation is taken in the repeated studies called The Global Warming's Six
Americas. These studies have been ongoing since 2008 and identify six target audiences for climate change communication, ranging from the dismissive (10% of the 981 respondents in May 2011), which is the least concerned and least motivated group with the lowest belief in climate change , via the doubtful (15%), the disengaged (10%), the cautious (25%) and the concerned (27%), to the alarmed (12%), which have the highest belief in global warming and who are most concerned and motivated (Leiserowitz et al., 2011b) . The results from the Six Americas studies have been useful in designing further studies e.g. of how different segments of the U.S. public responds to different framings of climate change (Myers et al., 2012) and to develop communication strategies targeted to different segments of the public e.g. visiting national parks (Akerlof et al., 2011) .
Audience segmentation may suggest a top-down perspective on communication, where the communicator decides what to communicate to which target group, which may seem at odds with a view of learning as dependent on interaction and dialogue. However, I would argue that the key idea of audience segmentation -that it is important to consider that different target audiences interpret climate change 29 communication differently -is relevant for environmental educators, who could benefit from knowledge on the learner's interpretative frames when designing non-formal climate change education. It has been noted that "/e/ffective environmental education and interpretation relies explicitly on understanding the audiences' values, attitudes, and beliefs, particularly towards a specific issue or a site-specific resource" (Brownlee et al. 2012 :2).
In sum, in line with the shifting focus in the the CCC literature from public understanding to public engagement in climate change, there is also increasing focus on ways of communicating climate change that take into account the need for audience segmentation and involving different publics in dialogue and deliberation on causes, impacts and responses to climate change. To enhance engagement, the literature stresses the importance of positive feedback on individual actions, locally and personally relevant framings of climate change, visibility and concretization of climate change-related issues and a focus on solutions rather than on catastrophic consequences of climate change. In the following we will turn to the implications of lessons learnt from the CCC literature for non-formal education on climate change.
7.Discussion
This paper set out to review climate change communication research, and discuss recurrent themes in the literature as well as possible futures for climate change communication and non-formal education. By identifying differences and commonalities in how lay people in different contexts and sub-segments of populations perceive and react to climate change, learning events could be designed in ways that make sense to different groups of learners. Although, admittedly, some of the communication literature employs a top-down perspective on communication and rests on an information-deficit model which treats information as neutral and objective, while ignoring the context-dependency of public understanding of climate change (Bulkeley, 2000; Potter & Oster, 2008) , there is an increasing focus in the CCC literature on public engagement in climate change as well as on "the constructivist nature of learning and individual variation in information processing and impact" (Whitmarsh, 2011:691) .
The review of the CCC literature points to at least three areas of particular importance for non-formal education. First, the trend in the literature to focus less on public understanding and more on public engagement actualizes the question of how to overcome the value-action gap in public behavior. It has been suggested that increased knowledge and awareness on climate change among the public will not automatically lead to lifestyle changes (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Whitmarsh et al., 2011) .
Although lack of knowledge is among the barriers to public engagement discussed in the literature, this barrier interacts with others such as social norms, worldviews, ideologies and lack of agency (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Wolf & Moser, 2011 Nevertheless, a recent focus group study among Swedish lay people (Wibeck, forthc.; Wibeck & Linnér, 2012) identified this as a crucial issue for the public. The participants in this study stated that they felt responsible as citizens for taking action to mitigate climate change. However, they also expressed frustration due to a sense of limited agency, in that their actions were perceived as having little actual impact. I argue that for future climate change communication and education to be perceived as legitimate by lay people, communicators and educators need to explicitly discuss the role of individual lay people's contributions in relation to responsibilities of other actors and discuss the need for lifestyle changes in relation to other mitigation options.
As the area of CCC is rapidly expanding and as new studies of public communication and public engagement are undertaken in more national contexts and local sub-segments of the audience, the CCC field will probably continue to be relevant for climate change educators across the world. Likewise, I believe that climate change communicators could learn a lot from professionals experienced in environmental education. Hence, there is large potential for further interaction between the fields of climate change communication and environmental education in the years to come.
8.Conclusions
In reviewing scholarly literature on climate change communication (CCC) published between 2000 and 2011 it was found that:
 Climate change is now firmly put on the public agenda. However, world media coverage of climate change is decreasing and in some countries there are signs of climate "fatigue" which could make the public less inclined to learn more More research into how publics in developing countries and more cross-country comparisons would make a valuable contribution to our knowledge on how sociocultural factors affect public engagement in climate change. Different types of barriers to public engagement in climate change are often intertwined. For instance, lack of scientific knowledge among the public may interact with others such as social norms, worldviews, ideologies and lack of agency. Hence, climate change communication and non-formal education need to address barriers to public engagement on several levels simultaneously.
 To overcome barriers to public engagement in climate change, the CCC literature points to the potentials of enabling positive feedback on individual actions, focusing on solutions rather than on catastrophic consequences of climate change, making complex science-based messages on climate change tangible and more concrete to lay people by means of images, metaphors and ICT-based visualizations, taking the interpretative frames and previous understandings of different audiences into account, and rethinking how the issue of climate change is framed to resonate with different publics.
